Stephen Sanderson's Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State (1981) begins with the premise that &dquo;the salvation or destruction of the present Mexican regime may well rest with that roughly 40 percent of the Mexican populace who now fill the countryside with their hard work and their poverty&dquo; (1981 : xi) . Although he does not enter the debate as to whether urban or rural popular movements will be the driving force of possible future radical social change in Mexico, his assumption is correct. The peasantry has been a central pillar of support (albeit passive) for the regime. To shake that pillar would indeed shake the regime to its foundations.
Sanderson grapples with the form and content of the contradictions inherent in the institutionalized Mexican Revolution's &dquo;populist pact.&dquo; The capitalist economic development process combined with the regime's historic social obligations necessarily generate conflicts between private accumulation and public equity. Sanderson's political economy approach explores the changing nature of these conflicts over time, leaving the reader with a clear sense of the loosening and tightening of the structural limits to reform in Mexico.
The historical background extends to a full discussion of the &dquo;liberal legacy,&dquo; the nineteenth-century roots of the dispossession of the rural majority (chap. 2). Agrarian Populism is particularly good at imparting a sense of the texture of the politics of land in Mexico, tracing the contours of the struggle over the role of property in society from the genocide of independent native peoples in the last century (chap. 3) It is surprising that it took until 1981 for the first comprehensive English-language history of Mexico's agrarian reform to appear. Sanderson avoided the traditional North American approach to the study of Latin American agrarian reform, which focuses on a self-contained public policy by looking at the &dquo;reform sector&dquo; in isolation from the rest of society. Analysis is often limited to whether or not the reform sector is economically productive or politically useful to power brokers. A few works stand out because they integrate an analysis of the reform itself with a vision of its role in the political economy of the society as a whole (e.g., Collins, 1982; Petras and LaPorte, 1971 (Fitzgerald, 1979; Hamilton, 1975; Saldivar, 1981 Fitzgerald's (1978 Fitzgerald's ( , 1979 Basanez, 1981; CEPAL, 1982a; Concheiro et al., 1979; Cordero, 1982; Quijano, 1981 Quijano, , 1983  Rey Romay, 1984; Saldivar, 1981; Tello, 1984 (1981: 199) . What are the appropriate criteria for measuring the outcome of a state-capital clash? It was a defeat for capital that most of the land expropriated was not returned, yet the incoming administration insured that it was extremely well compensated.
One result is that today the victorious ejidatarios, organized into the Coalition of Collective Ejidos of the Yaqui and Mayo Valleys, continue to be of national political and economic importance. They produce with collective labor, and after years of struggle won their economic autonomy from the state, managing their own credit union, inputs, initial processing, and marketing. They produce 5 percent of the national wheat and soybean crops, with record yields. Their successful combination of economic and political autonomy has encouraged increased coordination with other independent regional peasant organizations around the country. The coalition stands as a permanent ideological challenge to the dominant system, showing, as they themselves put it, that &dquo;the collective ejido is more efficient than the parcelled ejidos or private property,&dquo; and that &dquo;there is nc1B way other than the democratization of the system: to achieve that the peasant producers themselves, through their base organizations, fully assume the responsibility of the management and administration of public resources destined for the countryside&dquo; (Coalicion de Ejidos... , 1982: 45-46) .
A state reformist thrust was nevertheless clearly blunted in national terms in 1976, and perhaps this was more important than the advances in Sonora. The agricultural entrepreneurs firmly reestablished both their political and economic hegemony in the countryside. They exercised their power to block substantive reforms designed to ensure social peace in their long run. They won a great ideological victory; their views dominated the debate on the causes of the deepening agricultural production crisis until the launching of SAM in 1980 (Gordillo and Rello, 1980 1983, changes in the Agrarian Reform law were much more "anti-campesino," comparing them to Alem&aacute;n's modifications of article 27 of the constitution. Calva charges that they will increase the power of local caciques and facilitate the granting of "immunity" to large landowners (1984: 4, passim) .
3. For important discussions of recent trends in the independent peasant movement, see Gustavo Gordillo's articles in El D&iacute;a (June 9, 14, 16, 1984 13, 1982) . Moreover, Barkin and Su&aacute; rez (1982: 64) 5. While it is indeed true that Womack opts for this "Tolstoyan" approach, Wolf does not avoid the substance of the debate. On the contrary, his "middle peasant" thesis about the driving force of contemporary Third World revolution is a major contribution to it.
6. On the differentiation of the peasantry and the debate over their class position, see the recent reviews and bibliographies in Canak (1982) , CEPAL (1982b ), De Janvry (1981 , and Lucas (1982) . On the new kinds of rural development packages, see Edelman (1980) , Galli (1981) , Redclift (1980) , and Tendler (1982) . For a particular application of these concerns to SAM, see Durston (1981) .
